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Gradualism and Chinese
Financial Reforms
In discussions ofthe optimal pace of transition
from a socialist to a market economy, those favor-
ing a "gradualist" approach often point to the
experience of the People's Republic ofChina. By
crossing the river from a centrally planned to a
market economy "one stone at a time;' as the
saying goes, the Chinese appear to have made
significant progress towards market reforms with-
out suffering the large output declines faced by
countries pursuing more rapid "cold turkey" re-
forms in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the pace of eco-
nomic growth in China since Deng Xiaoping's
historic 1992 call for deeper economic restructur-
ing and greater experimentation with markets has
been staggering. Real CDP grew at a 13 percent
annual rate in 1992 and 1993, and double-digit
real GDP growth is forecasted again for 1994.
In spite of its dramatic growth performance, the
current economic situation in China suffers from
the limited control the Chinese central govern-
ment appears to enjoy over its own monetary
policy and the rapid inflation that is emerging as
a result. In the first eight months of 1994, prices
rose at a 26 percent annual rate nationally.
Policymakers commonly respond to high infla-
tion rates by slowing the pace of reform. Indeed,
China reverted back to numerous price controls
this fall in an effort to dampen inflation. These
price controls are welcomed by the large "state-
owned enterprise"sector, half of which is cur-
rently estimated to be operating at a loss, since
their output prices are already controlled by the
government while their input prices often are
not. Consequently, by pursuing such inflation-
fighting measures as reversion to price controls,
Beijing also is effectively pursuing a gradualist
path towards reform by aiding firms in the state-
owned enterprise sector to avoid bankruptcy.
It might seem, then, that Chinese officials are
faced with anundesirable choice between faster
reforms and runaway inflation. However, in this
Weekly Letter, weargue that this is not the case.
We examine the problems experienced in the
Chinese financial sector during the reform pe-
riod, and explain why the reforms undertaken
in this sector fail to address the fundamental
source of China's inflation problems. We argue
that a faster pace of reform is compatible with
controlling inflation in China.
Problems in Chirla's financial system
China's ongoing need to support the state-owned
enterprise sector is a major cause ofthe nation's
inflation problem. State-owned enterprises ac-
counted for 60 percent of the country's total fixed
investment in1993. The state-owned enterprises
provide lifetime employment, as well as numer-
ous benefits such as housing and pensions to its
workers. It is estimated that shutting down the
unprofitable state-owned enterprises alone would
result in laying off more than 100 million workers
with no benefits. Consequently, political pressure
has led both central and local Chinese banks to
contribute massively towards maintaining the op-
eration ofthese state-owned enterprises through
the extension of loans ofdubious value. The result-
ing increases in the money supply have generated
inflation. This pressure has been exacerbated by
the lack of independence ofthe Chinese banking
system,and in particular the People's Bank of
China (PBC) from the State Council.
The problem also is aggravated by the structure
of the Chinese banking system. Banks are re-
sponsible for issuing "policy loans" to finance
the deficits of the Ministry of Finance and the
losses of the state-owned enterprises. The gov-
ernment dictates both the allocation ofcapital
PACIFIC BASin nOTES Pacific Basin Notes appears on an occasional
basis. It is prepared under the auspices oftheCenter for Pacific Basin Monetary and Economic Studies
(CPBMES) within the FRBSF's Economic Research Department.FABSF
and the terms of lending to the banking system.
The result is that an estimated40 percent of the
loans extended to the state sector are listed as
nonperforming.
The process of reform itself also has contributed
to inflation. As reform progressed, decentraliza-
tion diminished the control of the PBC headquar-
ters over the activities of its branch offices. This
allowed .local governments to pressure local PBC
banks to extend credit ofdubious qualityto local
financial institutions.
The situation became critical in 1992 and the
first half of 1993. Local branches of the PBC
found themselves under heavy pressure to issue
loans not included in the central government's
investment plan. These funds sometimes were
used for highly speculative activities, including
real estate ventures and stock market specula-
tion. Indeed, there were reports that branches of
the PBC not only failed to regulate this activity,
but also were active participants themselves.
This forced the PBC to issue additional loans to
finance planned investment, further increasing
the money supply.
Financial reforms
The government sought to curb many of these
problems in its financial sector with a 16-point
program for reform of domestic financial policy
in July of1993. The plan restricted credit exten-
sion by the banking system, particularly the
ability of local financial institutions to engage
in speculative activity. In addition, the plan en-
hanced the ability of the central government to
allocate credit towards its priority investments.
The financial system also has been restructured
to allow the PBC to function similarly to the cen-
tral banks in developed countries, such as the
Federal Reserve System in the United States, with
the mandateto conductdomestic monetary policy
through manipulation of bank loan rates, open-
market operations, and changes in bank reserve
requirements. However, the PBC will not enjoy
the independence associated with the central
banking systems in many developed nations. The
central bank still will be required to implement
the policies ofthe State Council.
Inaddition, China is converting its four special-
ized banks-the Bank of China,the Agricultural
Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank, and
the People's Construction Bank ofChina-into
commercial banks. These banks are currently
encouraged both to perform as profitable institu-
tions and to offer liberal loans tothe unprofitable
state-owned enterprises. Under the new system,
these banks will be allowed to make their loan
decisions independently andwill be responsible
for theirprofits and losses. Policy-based lending
activities will be undertaken by three newly cre-
ated financial institutions: the State Develop-
ment Bank, the Export--lmport Credit Bank,and
the Agricultural Banks of China. These banks will
be bond-financed and hence will place no direct
pressure on the domestic money supply.
Current financial system performance
The reforms ofthe Chinese financial system ap-
pear compatible with a gradualist path of reform.
They correct a number of particularly glaring de-
ficiencies from the previous system which led to
poor credit allocation decisions and eventual loss
of control over the financial system. At the same
time, the State Council maintains some control
over the PBC and the reforms call for some policy-
based credit extension to take place independent
ofthe central bank. However, the Chinese expe-
rience subsequent to the July 1993 reforms re-
veals the pitfalls in this gradualist reform policy.
Initially, the 16-point plan was somewhat suc-
cessful in tightening credit. However, the tighter
credit created problems when farmers harvested
a bumper crop. Banks had difficultypaying farm-
ers for their mandated crop production. Com-
bined with the mandate under the plan which
forbids banks from issuing IOUs to farmers,
as had commonly been done in the past, banks
found their working capital constrained. This re-
duced the magnitude of credit banks were able
to issue to the state-owned enterprise sector,
which relied on new loans to pay suppliers or
to finance outstanding debt. Particularly hard hit
were the raw materials sectors; they faced re-
ductions in lenient loans, which threatened to
create shortages. This phenomenon has been
termed "triangular debt;' where unprofitable
state-owned enterprises, which are kept in op-
eration through cash infusions from the banking
sector, fail to make required payments to other
unprofitable firms. The central bank responded
to the liquidity shortage largely caused by the
16-point austerity plan by claiming victory over
excessive growth and resuming expansion of the
money supply. In the November 1993 Central
Comrnitteeplenary session, calls again were
heard tospeed up the pace ofreform, with refe
erences to the 16-poihtplan notably .a.bsent. The
backtracking on the austerityplan resulted in
a renewed expansion ofthe money supply and a
rapid increase in inflation in the beginningof1994.In 1994, the government repeatedly switched be-
tween austerity policies designed to address the
growing inflation problem and expansionary
measures designed to avoid unemployment. In
March, a State Planning Commission report out-
lined a plan for loweringthe inflation rate to 10
percent through reductions in capital expendi"
tures and bond financing of deficits. This bond
financing is possible only through forced sales of
government bonds at rates wellbelow urban in-
flation rates. In addition, political pressures led
PrimeMinister Li Peng to announce in October
of 1994 thatlocalgovernments would berespon-
sible for maintenance of 1/acceptably" low food
prices. In practice, this implies the reinstatement
of price controls and the subsidization of produc.:
tion. These subsidies may yield government def-
icits requiring monetization, implying further
pressure on pnces.
Conclusion
While the financial reforms being pursued by
China should improve the operation ofthe finan-
cial system, they do not address the problems
associated with maintaining the operations of the
large unprofitable state-owned enterprise sector.
As long as this sector requires continuous infusions
offundstostay afloat, the Chinese governmentwill
be required either to forgo other expenditures,
such as much needed improvements in infrastruc-
ture, or monetizethese expenditures by increasing
the money supply. Consequently, the reforms ofthe
financial system do not address a fundamental
source of inflationarypressure, namely, the pol-
icy of maintainingthe operation of unprofitable
state-owned enterprises. Over the long run, more
rapid reform, in the form ofdosing unprofitable
state-owned enterprises, may lead to less infla-
tion rather than more.
However, one should not understate the difficulty
associated with closing these enterprises. Under
the current system, a largeportiol1ofthelosses
ofthe state-owned enterprises are POlky in-
duced, stemming from price cdntrolsandjJoor
management incentives. Consequently, the fact
that a state-owned enterprise is currently losing
money may notbe sufficient evidence to. moti-
vate closing it down.
In addition, the government is particularly sen-
sitive tothe political difficulties associated with
the displacement of 100 million workers. Current
estimates suggest that the agricultural sector also
is on the verge ofreleasing a large quantity of .
labor. Chinese officialsestimatethatonly200
million of the current 450 millionworkers in the
agricultural labor force can be profitably em-
ployed in that sector. Itwill take time to absorb
these laborers into the growing sectors of the
Chinese economy, such as the very successful
market-oriented township and village enterprises
and special economic zones. Therefore, the Chi-
nese government is determined to keep the state-
owned enterprises open. Some efforts to improve
the productivity ofthis sector withoutdosing
plants have taken place. The government has at-
tempted to merge failing enterprises with health-
ier ones. There have also been limited movements
towards privatization of state-ownedenterprises
through the issue of equity.
In the meantime, the burden of a gradualist path
of reform appears to have fallen on the Chinese
financial system in the form of the current ram-
pant inflation. As in most inflationary regimes, the
fundamental source of this inflation is unsustain-
able fiscal policy, in this case, using government
funds to bailout failing sectors ofthe economy.
Reform ofthe structure ofthe banking sector alone
cannot bring inflation down.
Mark Spiegel
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